Why Olaf Scholz hesitates to send Ukraine heavy weapons

ON FEBRUARY 27th, three days after Russia invaded Ukraine, Olaf Scholz delivered a speech to Germany’s parliament that astonished even his close political allies. Calling the moment a Zeitenwende (“turning point”), the German chancellor outlined the biggest strategic shift in German security, foreign and energy policy in the federal republic’s history. Earlier he had refused operating permission for Nord Stream 2, an $11bn pipeline to carry natural gas from Russia to Germany which has taken many years to build, but which allies had long warned would reinforce Germany’s dependence on the Kremlin. Now the understated chancellor, who during his first two months in office seemed to have gone into hiding, announced a startling plan. It included an increase in Germany’s defence spending from 1.5% of GDP to the NATO target of 2%, the establishment of a €100bn ($110bn) special fund for the Bundeswehr (the German armed forces), and the construction of two liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals to reduce Germany’s dependence on Russian energy.